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**Re-founding Hemispheric Security:
Toward a Democratic Community of American
States**

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Introduction

International security in the post Cold War presents three major tendencies: the declining of war, in classical fashion; a growing capacity of States to “build community,” particularly in the security field; and the emergence of risks, actors and threats of a new type. Authors have paid particular attention to the decreased probability of war and inter-State conflict, together with the emergence of new sources of risk and instability¹. Some studies emphasize strategic uncertainty, on the one hand, and the building of security partnerships, on the other, particularly at the regional level, as the predominant features of the emerging international security milieu². Some analysts have characterized these changes as a transition from the predominance of war and strategy, towards the reign of security and prevention³.

Notwithstanding, cooperative approaches to national and regional security, and constructivist analyses of security community building produced resistance in military establishments, skepticism and neglect in strategic circles, and cautiousness and not a few caveats in the academic world. However, with the divergent tendencies of international security in the 1990's, which showed heterogeneous mixes of regional logics and agendas, cooperative security and security community building became a (sometimes significant, sometimes modest) dimension of regional security experiences and gained a place of increasing importance in academic and policy circles⁴.

The Americas did not escape these heterogeneous, divergent tendencies. The contrast between subregional zones of democracy, peace and long-term stability, on the one hand, and zones of crisis, instability and uncertainty, on the other, appears as a reflection of the dual tendencies of the international security context of the mid and late nineteen nineties⁵. In turn, the relationship between **democracy and security** constituted a key aspect of the community building process in the context of Mercosur, plus associate countries, Chile and Bolivia⁶. Something similar, however with major restrictions, occurred in the context of the Central America peace process.

Since the beginning of the nineties, when the aforementioned tendencies started to emerge, a process of critical reflection and political revision of hemispheric security took place in the Americas. This process had important implications for the security policies and predominant security perceptions of American States. During the nineties, the latter gradually implemented preventive mechanisms and developed cooperative approaches to security matters. These new elements did not exclude, but were combined with traditional conceptions of national security and regional equilibrium based on deterrence and military balance. Nevertheless, the new elements triggered what some authors have recently discussed as “**security process**.”⁷

Besides important intra-regional differences, the security process introduced cooperation and confidence-building mechanisms as basic elements of regional security. It gradually cleared the path—especially in the sub region formed by Mercosur and its associates—for more “globalist” security visions, such as the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as regional and international security matters. Traditional defense conceptions, based on dissuasion, military balance and the balance of power are still in force as an essential part of the predominant security vision in military establishments. However, the security process which began with the **Santiago Commitment of 1991** gradually modified threat perceptions, reciprocal visions of military institutions, and conceptions of the role of armed forces in the emergent regional and global contexts.

This process was built on the basis of the American States' will, proclaimed in the Santiago Commitment, of inactivating hypothesis of conflict, endorsing the stability of democratic institutions, increasing the transparency of defense policies, strengthening civilian control of the armed forces, and developing preventive abilities and military cooperation mechanisms. This paper analyzes the major institutional manifestations of that process at the hemispheric and subregional levels and, in its final section, raises some issues in regard to the revision of the hemispheric security system and its prospects for the immediate future, in face of recent drawbacks in the regions' democratic consolidation process.

1. The Santiago Commitment and the hemispheric security process

The OAS's General Assembly meeting in Santiago, Chile in June 1991 was a turning point in regional relations. It was the first time that every American State, except one, had democratic political systems. The end of the Cold War marked a new conceptual and political context in which democracy has played a crucial role in modifying the approach to security. In this meeting, OAS member States made a security pledge to be carried out within the decade known as Resolution 1080 or the Santiago Commitment.

The latter emphasized the preservation of stability and consolidation of democratic institutions, the inactivation of 'hypothesis of conflict' and the systematic instrumentation of confidence-building measures between neighboring countries. The revision of the Inter-American Treaty for Reciprocal Assistance (or Rio Pact) did not play an important role in this process. Several antecedents, particularly the United States' Santo Domingo 1962 invasion and the support of the 1954 Guatemalan government's overthrowing, have undermined the credibility of the treaty as a security instrument. More recently, the Falklands War and the end of the Cold War further weakened the treaty⁸.

Presently, the American States have committed to establishing action mechanisms when democratic institutional order is violated and a security consultation process has been set up to revise and update the conceptions and hypothesis on which member States based their provisions. The establishment of democratic regimes and the end of the Cold War has favored regional peace and security. However, the American States' initiative, stated in Resolution 1080⁹, has had an even deeper meaning. It launches a process that affects the basic propositions on which security relations between regional States were based. It has transformed visions, budgets and ties in this field.

Resolution 1080 expressed these purposes and set the basis for a notion of security that links together democracy and regional security, as two different yet inseparable concerns. Argentina and Canada initially played very active roles amongst the growing number of States that considered cooperative security to be the most appropriate policy in light of recent changes in international conditions, the region's objectives, and the establishment of democratic regimes in nearly every country.

This focus came forth after the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) experience¹⁰. It was compatible with the new approaches to security in the diplomatic and political circles of the American States after the establishment of democracy in the region at the end of the Cold war. Cooperative security highlighted the importance of contents and transparency of defense policies as well as certain features of the civilian-military relations system –specifically, the subordination of armed forces to political authorities in a democratic system, and the reduction of armed forces' institutional autonomy.

The growing diffusion of this concept was one of the main results of the security process. It implied a change in the common values and political objectives of the American States. There were important precedents of confidence building, such as the protocols signed by Argentina and Brazil on the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and the Central American Peace Process. These precedents, combined with the actions and pledges developed after the Santiago Commitment constituted significant steps towards the construction of a **security community**.

The latter implies more than a situation of standing peace and cooperation. It regards a growing degree of certainty, that the use of force is no longer an instrument the States would use or consider as a possibility in their reciprocal relations. Furthermore, the path towards a security community requires an increasing sense of common or shared identity through established interactions and routines. The process does not focus on the creation of institutions. Community building does not mean to move from situation "A" (in which States behave according to a series of egotistic interests and objectives) to situation "B" (in which States' behavior is based on the same interests and objectives, but constrained by rules and mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes). Community building is based on shared interests and values that contribute to a growing sense of common identity¹¹.

The American States are bound in this direction. Wide spread interactions, political decisions and the creation of arenas have taken place throughout the decade. These produced and reflected a change in the prevailing guidelines and common perceptions of regional security. Factors such as democratization, regional integration, and the post Cold War international milieu have offered a favorable environment for such changes

in the security field. However, these changes are the result of a specific process, which is still ongoing and requires deeper transformations of perceptions, policies and institutional frameworks in order to meet the security challenges of this era.

1.1 The Permanent Hemispheric Security Commission

The General Assembly approved the creation of a Working Group to uphold Resolution 1080's objectives. This gave way to the Committee on Hemispheric Security the following year. The constitution of this Committee allowed for the treatment of issues that until that moment had not been on the OAS's agenda, such as confidence-building, the deactivation of intra-regional hypothesis of conflict, the reform of the Inter-American Defense Board, and the security of Caribbean countries.

However, being a Special Committee, it was not permanent and would function only as long as the General Assembly annually renewed its mandate. In 1995, during the meeting held in Haiti, the OAS General Assembly decided to replace the Special Committee with the Permanent Hemispheric Security Commission. Thus the security of the region was now to be incorporated into the OAS's institutional system.

1.2 New arenas for the security process

After the Santiago Commitment, a series of meetings on security matters were held at the hemispheric level. There were also other meetings, promoted by governmental, private, regional, inter-regional and other types of institutions. Examples of these are: the OAS Experts' Meetings on the Promotion of Confidence and Security Measures in Buenos Aires, March 1994; the First Defense Ministerial of the Americas summoned by the Department of Defense of the United States in Williamsburg in July 1995; the Regional Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures, organized by the OAS in Santiago, Chile in November of the same year; the Second Meeting of the European Union and the Rio Group Dialogue (on Security issues) in Quito in November 1996 and the Second Defense Ministerial in Bariloche in October of the same year. These were some of the most important events that contributed towards the construction of common notions and the institutional network for a new hemispheric security system in the nineties.

During the Meeting on Confidence-Building Measures and Security Arrangements in the Region, held in Buenos Aires from the 15th to the 18th of March, 1994, most of the American States' civilian and military experts recommended that the American State's Organization, through a Special Hemispheric Security Commission, continue to examine such issues as confidence-building, the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflict prevention. They also recommended that member States put confidence-building measures into practice and regularly inform the OAS of the application of those measures. Experts proposed that a Regional Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures be held in 1995¹².

1.3 Academic networks and the security process

Progress in the security processes in the region was not a result of actions carried out by State organizations and institutions only. Different academic entities have systematically contributed towards this progress, through the analysis and dissemination of information as well as the organization of meetings and other activities. This contributed to the establishment of bonds between civilian and military experts in the region. Mentioning a few examples inevitably implies the risk of omitting significant contributions. Nevertheless, our intention is not to recount the most important experiences, but to illustrate their character through a few examples.

The Peace and Security in the Americas Program, conducted by Flacso Santiago and the Wilson Center for International Scholars and the Latin-American Center for Defense and Disarmament (CLADE) carried out extensive activities in the region on confidence-building measures that included a thorough series of reports and meetings. The August 1995 Seminar on Mutual Confidence Measures: Strategic Balance and Verification Processes, was organized by the Peace and Security Program with the collaboration of FOCAL Canada, the support of the Instituto Matías Romero of the Mexican External Relations Secretariat, the Canadian Ministry of External Relations and the US Agency for Arms Control. This Seminar contributed to the development of an academic and a regional policy network.

IRELA, the European and Latin-American Relations Institute, coordinated a series of inter-regional meetings that meant a significant contribution to the security process. From 1995 on, the European Union and the Rio Group promoted the completion of a series of inter-regional yearly conferences with the intention of creating civilian-military and inter-regional dialogues on security issues. The first reunion took place in October of that year in Punta del Este. The meeting, officially named European Union-Rio Group Dialogue on Security and Confidence-Building Measures, opened a debate where the cautiousness and the diplomatic spirit of participants prevailed. Overall, the meeting yielded important results.

The meeting in Punta del Este created an intra and inter-regional dialogue that other, more formal settings have not allowed. This aspect was, an important step and helped fortify the decision to invite a greater number of Latin American military personnel to future meetings. At the same time, the Punta del Este Meeting moved towards the extension and adoption of confidence-building measures and a preventive outlook. These were seen as efficient instruments to fortify security relations between neighboring States and regional associates. This meeting cleared the way for future meetings with more military participation and more extensive discussions of security matters.

The II European Union and the Rio Group Dialogue on Security Issues, in November 1996 in Quito, and the Santa Cruz de la Sierra Meeting in December 1997 made great progress in this direction. In the latter, the creation of a **Confidence Building and Conflict Prevention Center for Latin America** was discussed. This proposal is a pending issue for future meetings.

The Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS) at the National Defense University (NDU) is a particularly important example of security community construction, as analyzed in this paper. The US Defense Minister announced the creation of the Center after the First Defense Ministerial Meeting of the Americas, held in Williamsburg, Virginia in July 1995. In this Meeting, defense leaders of Latin America and the Caribbean, asked the United States for assistance in improving civilian expertise in defense and military matters. Delegates emphasized the importance of a civilian association with the technical ability, respect and understanding of the culture, missions and capacities of the armed forces, as this would benefit the strengthening of regional democratic systems. William J. Perry, United States Secretary of Defense announced the creation of the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the October 1996 meeting in Bariloche.

The Center's mission was to develop civilian specialists in defense and military matters by providing graduate level programs in defense planning and management, executive leadership, civilian-military relations and inter-agency operations. As an explicit example of the philosophy that inspired the construction of an American Continental security community, the participants in the Center programs consisted of military officers, civilians with defense related duties in both the executive and legislative branches of the government, and persons with defense interests in academia, the media, and the private sector.

Directly linked to the contents and dynamics of a security community, the Center provided a forum for enhancing mutual understanding and learning about the complexities involved in defense decision-making and resource management in democratic societies. The programs were tailored to requirements identified in the hemisphere's political environments, linked to the formulation and implementation of defense and security policies. Clearly, this initiative reflected the character assumed by this security process in an advanced stage of institutional maturity.

The Academies and universities of many countries have systematically and cumulatively contributed towards a regional security community. The following should be mentioned, among many others: the Brazilian government's Secretaria de Asuntos Estrategicos, the Núcleo de Estudos Estratégicos of the Universidade Estadual do Campinas, the Rial program (Relaciones Internacionales de América Latina), the Instituto Peruano De Polemología, the Peitho Institute of Uruguay, the Seguridad Estratégica Regional forum, the Centro de Estudios para la Nueva Mayoría, CARI (Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones Internacionales), the National Defense Schools of Chile, Argentina and other countries, the War Schools of nearly all Hemispheric States, the Instituto de Altos Estudios Políticos y Marítimos de la Universidad Marítima de Chile, and other diplomatic institutions.

1.4 The Miami Summit

In December 1994, the first post-cold war meeting of the American States took place. President William Clinton convened the meeting, attended by the Presidents and Prime Ministers of 34 American States, except for Cuba, which was not invited. Due to the opposition of several countries, most notably Mexico and Brazil, security issues did not form part of the agenda.

During the preparatory stages, President Clinton's representative visited several countries, intending to set an agenda for the meeting based on consensus. Certain States firmly opposed the inclusion of security issues in the agenda. As a result, during the First Americas Summit, Presidents and Prime Ministers debated issues such as drug-trafficking, illegal immigration, antiterrorism, defense of human rights and the strengthening of democracy, while excluded issues referring to regional and subregional security.

Argentina and Canada firmly –but unsuccessfully- urged that the Hemispheric Summit include issues such as: the work carried out by the Special Hemispheric Security Commission, the possibility of carrying out periodic Defense Ministers' conferences, parliamentary Defense and External Relations commissions' talks, the role of civilian leadership in the definition of security policies; implementation of mutual confidence-building measures and support of United Nations' actions in peace and security issues. A large group of Argentine NGOs carried out a series of preparatory meetings to set a security issues' agenda. The text that the participating organizations turned over to the government included a similar agenda to the one mentioned before: participation in multilateral peace forces, weapons and sensitive technology controls, creation of an American Defense Ministerial; analysis of continental measures to preserve the environment; etc. These failed attempts –that in the light of the progress made in the regional security process seem to be common sense- led the way for the First Meeting of Regional Defense Secretaries concerning the structure and organizational functioning of OAS.

1.5 The Williamsburg Declaration

In mid 1995, after an invitation issued by President Clinton to the Heads of state and Government of the American States (except Cuba) the First Defense Ministerial of the Americas was convened in Williamsburg, a place historically rooted in democracy and citizen participation. On July 25th and 26th, 1995, regional defense secretaries, and in some cases, ambassadors in Washington, met to discuss such issues as the role of the Armed Forces in democracy, participation in peace keeping operations, implementation of confidence-building measures at a hemispheric level and development of civilian specialists in defense issues.

A short time after the meeting, in September 1995, the Department of Defense of the United States published the United States Security Strategy for the Americas¹³ document. This document pointed to the stability of democratic institutions as an essential part of regional security and, as such, a priority for the United States. It stated that the American States' ability to successfully face growth, international insertion and regional security objectives greatly depended on the strengthening of democratic institutions. There was also great concern about such unconventional challenges as drug trafficking and terrorism.

The document put forward the view that a strong emphasis on democracy, free trade and a growing perception of security would enable the pursuit of regional security objectives. A significant step towards regional approval was taken at the Miami Summit in December 1994. The States committed themselves to the creation of a Free Trade Area by the year 2005. In sum, the document mentioned the following points as regional strategic objectives at the threshold of the 21st Century:

- Maintain a commitment to democratic norms, including civilian control on defense issues, civil-military relations and respect for human rights.
- Encourage the peaceful settlement of disputes, the transparency of arms and military expenses and the development of confidence and security measures appropriate for the region;
- Cooperate in the battle against drug trafficking and terrorism.
- Improve cooperative security with the region's countries and promote the development of joint efforts such as peacekeeping operations.

These standards were ratified and extended during the Defense Ministerial of the Americas in Bariloche in October 1996. Defense Secretaries confirmed the importance of deepening hemispheric security and defense cooperation as a way of defending representative democracy. In this case, the participants' agreed on a document stating the main agreements reached in the meeting.

1.6 The Second Santiago Declaration

In November 1995, the First Regional Conference on Confidence-Building Measures was held, sponsored by the American States Organization in Santiago, Chile. In this meeting member States issued the Santiago Declaration, which reaffirmed the region's commitment to the reformulation of hemispheric security, and proposed a series of confidence-building measures to be gradually implemented.

The Santiago Declaration on security and confidence-building measures of November 9th, 1995 recommended a series of cooperative security mechanisms. The Declaration established the regional adoption of a new language in security matters. This represented the States' commitment to work together in this field. The measures proposed by the Declaration were mostly targeted at the transparency of defense policies:

- Gradually adopt agreements for prior notification of military exercises.
- Exchange information and participate in the Register of Conventional Arms of the UN and the Standardized International Military Expenses Report.
- Encourage the elaboration and exchange of information about policies and defense doctrines.
- Consider a consultation process to move towards conventional weapons limitation and control.
- Invite observers to military exercises and military plants to observe routine operations and to exchange civilian and military personnel for training.
- Hold meetings to discuss incident prevention and to increase the security of terrestrial, maritime and air transit.
- Develop and implement communications between civilian or military authorities of neighboring countries, in regards to their frontier situation.
- Carry out seminars, courses and studies on confidence-building measures and policies with the participation of civilian and military officers, as well as on the special security concerns of small insular States.
- Carry out a high level meeting to address security concerns of small insular states.

The Declaration also stated that due to the importance of understanding measures that were being or could be applied, representatives would agree to periodically inform the OAS Hemispheric Security Commission of confidence-building measures, in an attempt to facilitate the preparation of a complete and systemic inventory of all measures entrusted by the OAS General Assembly.

At the same time, the OAS General Secretary, Dr. Cesar Gaviria, put forward a critical assessment of the advances and limitations of the regional security process. He stated that the Hemisphere did not yet possess a modern security agenda capable of replacing Cold War parameters. However, he acknowledged that the region had progressed in its identification of values and foundations of a new strategic vision. But, as he explained, it would be overstated to say that there was a regionally accepted consensus.

Dr. Gaviria emphasized that Latin America's democratization seemed to be consolidated for the time being. Consequently, one of the most important tasks of hemispheric security in the coming decades would be not only to preserve and defend democracy, but also to strengthen it through political, economical and social measures. He also pointed out the importance of good civilian-military relations and suggested that armed institutions should open larger spaces to allow civilian participation in the discussion and design of national defense policies. These measures would help to insure that the search for security, peace and tranquility would be a common objective in all sectors. These proposals reflected the tardy and limited progress of the past fifteen years. Never the less, this constituted what could be called the common minimum denominator, i.e. a parameter to evaluate the region's progress as whole.

1.7 The San Salvador Declaration

In late February 1998, representatives of OAS member states met in San Salvador, in the Central American Republic of El Salvador to follow up on the 1995 Santiago Conference. During this Regional Conference, member states adopted what they named the San Salvador Declaration on Confidence and Security Building Measures. With this declaration they reaffirmed the full standing of the Santiago Declaration on Confidence and Security Building Measures of 1995 as well as the measures included in this Declaration. They also expressed their commitment to continue to strengthen confidence and security in the hemisphere. The Declaration backed the American States' commitment to democracy, disarmament and international peace and security.

The declaration emphasized the importance of the Tlatelolco Treaty as a fundamental antecedent in non-proliferation matters, which made Latin America the first world region free of nuclear weapons. It also accentuated member States' commitment towards the global elimination of antipersonnel land mines and the adoption of amended Protocol II of the United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions of the Use of Certain Conventional Arms which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects.

The declaration also highlighted the importance of the Complete Prohibition of Nuclear Tests Treaty, the Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production, Storage and Employment of Chemical Weapons and the near conclusion of negotiations of a Protocol to the Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production and Storage of Bacteriological and Toxic Weapons and Destruction. The Declaration stated that the OAS planned to complete dissemination in Central America by the year 2000. It emphasized the achievements of the Program of Assistance to Dissemination in this region, the participation and support of member states, and the technical assistance of the Inter-American Defense Board.

Subsequently, the States made an announcement calling for the prompt confirmation and enforcement of the Interamerican Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials and the enforcement of the Treaty on Democratic Security in Central America. Founded on its own security model, this represented a significant step for the sub-region. The Declaration emphasized that the Security Commission established by the treaty was developing an annual confidence and security building measures program.

Following the Santiago Declaration, the American States initiated a consultation process for the limitation and control of conventional weapons. Several states produced papers on the subject and carried out a process of analysis and discussion within the context of the Rio Group. The Declaration highlighted the progress made by Southern Cone States in matters of mutual confidence and security after the 1995 Santiago Declaration. These included the establishment of bilateral consultations and coordination mechanisms in security issues as well as the completion of combined military exercises between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay¹⁴. It also signaled the importance of the II Hemispheric Meeting of Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces to encourage cooperation and put into practice military confidence-building measures. It also emphasized that member states inform the Hemispheric Security Commission about the adoption and instrumentation of confidence and security building measures to allow for a complete and systematic inventory. This inventory was to be taken by a Commission, according to the OAS General Assembly agreement in relation to the Santiago Declaration¹⁵.

The Declaration represented a long-term perspective of the security process. It highlighted the fact that the growing application of security and confidence-building measures were signs of the States' political determination. This contributed to an increase in hemispheric security and favored greater cooperation in the future. It also recommended that member states consider other measures in addition to those signed in the Santiago Declaration.

The new recommendations sought to extend the seminars, courses and studies examined in the Santiago and San Salvador Declarations on security and confidence-building measures to include foreign service schools, military academies, investigation centers and universities. In addition, they promoted information exchange through the publication of official documents and books on defense and allowed for more transparency in countries' defense policies, including the structure and organization of their Armed forces. They recommended the establishment of a common methodology to compare military expenses, keeping in mind the United Nations Standardized International Report on Military Expenses; and advocated an improvement

in the quality and quantity of information forwarded by member states to the UN Register of Conventional Arms. Collectively, these recommendations strengthened the Hemisphere's contribution towards the objectives of this register.

2. The southern cone as a peace and security area

2.1 Cooperation in non proliferation matters

The signing of a series of agreements between Argentina and Brazil for the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy was the most immediate antecedent of the regional confidence construction process. Non-proliferation policies carried out by Argentina and Brazil in the nineties, such as adherence to the 1991 Quadripartite Agreement, the Tlatelolco ratification, the MTCR and the NPT, are an indication of the maturity of the approximation process and the redefinition of bilateral relations that came about as a result of the collapse of both countries' military governments in the late seventies. Brazil and Argentina took up these policies again as democracy was consolidated. Both countries found mutual support in each other. Cooperative progress in the nuclear field not only contributed towards a change in mutual perceptions in security matters, but also cleared the road for bolder decisions in matters of economic integration. This was the next stage of approximation and marked a growing strategic association between both countries.

It is only from this perspective, where economical, political and security issues constitute facets of the same process, that the significance of bilateral cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the development of a common nuclear policy can be perceived. The experience of bilateral cooperation in the field of weapons of mass destruction, initiated in the eighties, was an antecedent of future cooperation among regional States in the field of conventional forces. It should be stressed that this had traditionally been the most sensitive issue for the military institutions involved.

Since the mid-eighties, Argentina and Brazil have signed many Declarations (Foz de Iguazu, 1985; Brasilia, 1986; Viedma, 1987; Ipero, 1988) and protocols on nuclear issues. This process ended at the beginning of the nineties, with the Foz de Iguazu Declaration on Argentine-Brazilian Common Nuclear Policy signed on November 28th, 1990, and the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy Agreement, signed in Guadalajara on July 18th, 1991.

By signing the Foz de Iguazu Declaration, Brazil and Argentina agreed to the mutual opening of all nuclear installations as well as a series of bilateral non-proliferation actions. Both governments agreed to establish a common system of mutual control on nuclear installations, and initiated joint negotiations with the International Organization of Atomic Energy for the application of all-inclusive safeguards. They also agreed on joint promotion for the actualization of the Tlatelolco Treaty on the proscription of Nuclear Weapons, ratifying it, and in this way allowed its full enforcement.

Despite these steps, neither country's nuclear programs had been incorporated into the international verification system. This was achieved with the signing of the Quadripartite Agreement for the Application of Safeguards in Vienna on December 13th 1991¹⁶ by Argentina, Brazil, the ABACC and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The signatory countries committed not to test, use, build or acquire nuclear weapons. The agreement advanced in the establishment of the SCCC Agreement under the ABACC's supervision and added a safeguard system provided by the IAEA. This way, by including Brazil and Argentina's own verification mechanism, the Quadripartite Agreement succeeded in making the nuclear activities of both countries totally transparent for the international community, even though the NPT had not yet been ratified. In 1992 - 1993, the ABACC inspected 46 installations of both countries while the Permanent Argentine-Brazilian Committee on Nuclear Policies carried out successive coordination meetings. In the following years, the ABACC consolidated the safeguard applications arranged by the Quadripartite Agreement, and the Permanent Committee met periodically. In this manner, a practice that acceptably fulfilled routine requirements was established and has continued throughout the decade¹⁷.

Argentina, Brazil and Chile also promoted a series of reforms to the Tlatelolco Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, signed in 1967, though not ratified by these countries. These reforms aimed at updating the Treaty, making its ratification possible and making it fully effective for the whole region. On August 26th, 1992, the amendments were approved and signed by the States in Mexico City during the OPANAL VII Extraordinary Period of the General Conference Sessions. The national legislative bodies of Argentina, Brazil and Chile approved the Treaty at the end of 1993.

Argentina, Brazil and Chile signed the Mendoza Declaration referring to chemical and bacteriological arms in September 1991, to which Bolivia, Ecuador and Uruguay later adhered to. By this agreement, they

agreed not to test, use, manufacture or produce either chemical or biological weapons, becoming original parties of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Argentina, Brazil and Chile were amongst the first States to conform to this regime.

2.2 Argentine-Brazilian military cooperation

The substantial exchanges and military cooperation activities carried out by Brazil and Argentina date back to the eighties when the Meetings of Joint Chiefs of Staff of Armed Forces of both countries started to meet. Argentina and Brazil have carried out these meetings since 1987 and representatives of Paraguay and Uruguay were included soon after. Since then, these periodical activities have been named Meetings of Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces of Mercosur Countries. Chile was included in these meetings in 1992 and has participated officially since 1993.

Both countries' navies have carried out personnel exchanges across a broad spectrum of functions that have included courses at War Schools, mutual participation in training activities and residency in the military units of the other country. Joint exercises such as the Operativo Fraternal have taken place annually, with participation of units of Mercosur countries, CAMAS (Control del Area Marítima Atlántico Sur) and ATLASUR (with South African, Argentine, Brazilian and Uruguayan affiliates).

In June 1996, Mercosur Presidents signed a Presidential Declaration on Political Dialogue in Potrero de los Funes. Its objectives were to establish consultation mechanisms and a political debate forum, examine international issues of special interest to the signatory States, agree on a common stand on these issues and to consider topics of common political interest related to other countries or international organizations. This meeting was of special significance to Argentina because of the support given by partners of the integration process to its claim on the Malvinas/Falklands Islands.

In September 1996, Argentine and Brazilian Armies carried out joint combat exercises in Caseros, Corrientes Province, under the orders of a bi-national military command. The Cruz del Sur military exercise, with the participation of 1300 men under the orders of a bi-national military command, was the first joint exercise to be carried out by both armies. During that same year, Argentine officers participated in the UN Peace Keeping Force sent by Brazil to Angola, and Brazilian officers took part in the Argentine Battalion in Cyprus.

The Cruz del Sur exercise was connected to a United Nations peacekeeping operation, not to a hypothesis of conflict. Nevertheless, the exercise was intense because of its objectives and the type of equipment used. Commanders utilized the occasion to deepen military bonds between both armies. Once the exercise was over, both countries' representatives agreed to carry out future exercises, periodically rotating between Argentine and Brazilian territory.

Favorable opinions of this approximation came from both Argentina and Brazil. The Chief of the Brazilian Presidency's Military House, General Alberto Cardoso, stated that there was a great possibility of continental military integration in the near future. At the same time, he noted the fact that Brazil had ended its hypothesis of conflict with Argentina, after standing for almost 150 years. The Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister, Andres Cisneros, stated that both countries' troops could create a joint subregional military command. In this scenario, both countries would find themselves sharing troops, commanded, on a rotating basis, by a Brazilian and an Argentine General, complete with integrated Chiefs of Staff. The integrated troops would move from one side of the border to the other, carrying out joint military maneuvers. Up to this point, Defense departments had collaborated with the integration process "by omission", overlooking the consideration of seeing the other country as an enemy. But as the integration process progressed, this was no longer considered feasible and common defense projects became necessary. In the past, Brazil and Argentina had not considered neighboring countries to be within the hypothesis of conflict and the Armed Force's had shifted focus towards other types of conflicts.

During the same month, both Armed Forces carried out the Fraternal joint operation. This particular exercise had been in operation since the seventies. But during the nineties, there was a qualitative jump in both the content and the types of information shared by both armies. For example, the Argentine aviation fleet landed on the Brazilian aircraft-carrier, which required access to the Brazilian navy's confidential information system, and the Argentine Super Etendard, of French origin, began training Brazilian officers.

Both exercises took place a short time before the II Defense Ministerial of the Americas in Bariloche, which intended to continue the work of the Williamsburg Meeting. In November, just prior to the meeting, Argentine and Brazilian Foreign Ministers, Guido Di Tella and Luis Felipe Lampreia, met in Tandil, Argentina, to analyze the security and cooperation issues involved in bilateral relations. Defense Minister Jorge Domínguez and the Chiefs of Staff of both countries Armed Forces also participated.

Shortly afterwards, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso's government constructed a new National Defense Plan, which was previously notified to Argentina. The Foreign Relations and National Defense Committee of the Republic's Presidency, created for this purpose, designed the plan. The Plan was the first national defense policy formulated explicitly after the military government that had ruled since the sixties. The new Defense Plan dismissed Argentina as a hypothesis of conflict and foresaw the transfer of concentrated troops in the South towards the Amazons. This change strengthened the integration process and opened the way for subregional military cooperation. Interestingly, even before the announcement of the new defense plan, Brazilian and Argentine authorities, looking towards the future, had suggested the possibility of forces from both countries combining to create a bi-national army.

In April, 1997, during the Summit in Itaipiva, near Rio de Janeiro, Argentine and Brazilian Presidents, Carlos Menem and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, signed a Memorandum of Understanding on International Security to establish a system of cooperation, communication and coordination between the Armed Forces of both States.

The document established a Permanent Consultation and Coordination Mechanism to fortify bilateral relations in international defense and security matters. Both Foreign Relations Ministries, Defense Ministries, Argentine Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretaria de Asunto Estrategicos, and the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces, Marine, Army and Air Force Ministries of Brazil formed part of this organization. Officials from other ministries were to be summoned depending on each meeting's agenda. The document reaffirmed the principles established by the United Nations and the Organization of American States Charters. It acknowledged both the Santiago Compromise and the Regional Conference on Mutual Confidence-building Measures of Santiago, Chile (November, 1995) as immediate antecedents to the consultation process in hemispheric security in the post Cold War world. The Memorandum of Understanding also highlighted that the consolidation of democracy in both States allowed a growing climate of confidence and cooperation that was essential to the integration of their people. After the meeting, diplomatic officers publicly heralded the agreement as a true strategic alliance.

In July 1997, civil and military authorities of both countries met to discuss the new bilateral military cooperation mechanism. In September, the Tamba I exercise was completed with the participation of military personnel from Brazilian and Argentine Armed Forces and the presence of Minister Jorge Domínguez. In October, the Cruz del Sur 97 exercise was carried out in Rosario do Sul with Brazilian, Uruguayan and Argentine armed forces personnel, and the presence of Presidents Cardoso, Sanguinetti and Menem. The exercise simulated joint participation in a multinational peace force and represented the largest military exercise ever to be carried out in Latin America; utilizing over 2410 men, 440 helicopters and 40 armored vehicles.

In November 1998, the Cruz del Sur 98 was completed in Paso de los Libres, Argentina, with the participation of Paraguay and the four members of Mercosur. Due to budgetary reasons, only a planning exercise was carried out with no troop maneuvers. Once again, the context of the exercise was a United Nations Peace Keeping mission.

2.3 Military cooperation between Argentina and Chile

Since the beginning of the decade, Argentine and Chilean governments have encouraged military cooperation, and all diplomatic aid has contributed towards rebuilding the mutual confidence damaged during the volatile situations of both countries in late 1978. What at first appeared to be a succession of limited measures in the new cooperation scenario, and consequently, not very significant from the military point of view and quite backwards in relation to the level of approximation reached in the political and economic fields, showed to be an effective strategy of confidence-building and mutual association between the armed forces of both countries.

During the first few years, exchanges between military institutions were limited to symbolic gestures, mainly exchanges between Armed Forces Schools, such as cabinet exercises for mutual support in case of catastrophes, technological development in common interests and exploration of possible cooperation areas to build mutual confidence. In November 1995, Argentine and Chilean governments signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the Strengthening of Cooperation in Mutual Interest Security Matters. The Permanent Security Committee was created by this Memorandum to investigate issues of mutual security cooperation. The Committee's work advanced confidence-building in the military field.

The Argentine and Chilean navies carried out bilateral meetings with authorities of the Austral area (Atlantic / South Pacific Zone), as well as personnel exchanges, SAR (Search and Rescue) and communication exercises. Also, both Air Forces began bilateral conversation rounds, in which confidence-building measures in different areas were agreed on, such as bilateral conferences on a Joint Chiefs of Staff level, personnel exchanges in courses and seminars and technical-logistical cooperation. In 1995, both navies held the first Chiefs of Staff Meeting.

A permanent communication system between the Chilean Air Force base of Punta Arenas and the Argentine Air Force base of Rio Gallegos was set up in Port Williams and Ushuaia to control air transit. Chilean Carabineros and Argentine Gendarmeria instrumented mechanisms to anticipate the squad movements of their respective forces in an attempt to avoid accidental situations at the frontier. This was a way of overcoming the particularly sensitive situation created by successive military incidents over the past decade – a fact that both forces had tried to overlook.

In Zapallar, in July 1997, Foreign Relations and Defense Ministers of both countries began Consultation Meetings. These meetings indicated a deepening in the confidence construction process. In April 1998, the XIX Inter-American Naval Conference took place. The Chiefs of Staff of the Argentine and Chilean Navies agreed to carry out joint exercises of maritime traffic naval control, search, rescue and salvage in the Austral Area. Both Navies committed to working jointly in the Antarctic area with an Antarctic Naval Patrol to complete search and rescue exercises, as well as pollution control.

In August the Vickaren exercise was carried out. On this occasion, Jorge Domínguez, Argentine Defense Minister and Admiral Swet Brownese, Commander of the Chilean Navy Squad met on La Argentina Destroyer. In combination with this exercise, Armed Forces of both countries also completed their first joint exercise, Andes I. On September 2nd and 3rd, 1998 a joint rescue simulation of a passenger aircraft was carried out in the area between Puerto Mont and Bariloche. That same month, the Commander of the Chilean Naval Area, Rear Admiral Hector Alvarez, took part in the Chilean Independence Day celebrations.

In November of that same year, joint exercises were carried out by Argentine and Chilean Navies in the Pacific. Military maneuvers between three Chilean warships and one Argentine ship took place at the same time that the Foreign Relations Ministries of both countries were in negotiations over a new agreement on the Hielos Continentales. This would put an end to the last point of disagreement of the frontier issue between both States.

On December 16th, 1998, Presidents Carlos Menem and Eduardo Frei signed an agreement on the Hielos Continentales. This achievement was described as the beginning of the end, since the agreement would then be debated in both countries' Congresses. Once this was completed, it would be issued as a Treaty. At the same time the Polar Antarctic joint patrol operation was carried out. It consisted of two parts, search and control joint maneuvers and the prevention and cleanup of hydrocarbon or toxic spills at sea. It also gave logistical support to army and scientific bases in the Antarctic. The combined assignments were completed from the Argentine base in Ushuaia and the Chilean base of Puerto Williams.

In February 1999, Presidents Carlos Menem and Eduardo Frei reached a military equilibrium agreement seeking transparency and balance in their defense investments. Although the measures were not to become effective until 2000, CEPAL was in charge of inquiries into the countries' military situations as well as for the comparison of defense investments, in the interim. The ratification of the Antarctic Treaty was also signed to preserve and reinforce peace and friendship.

In March 1999, the Deputy Chief of the Chilean Army, General Mayor Carlos Chacon Guerrero and his Argentine colleague, General Anibal Laiño met for the first time to define joint military exercises involving the

displacement of troops for activities in the mountains (using no more than 100 men from each country). In April 1999 Admiral Jorge Arancibia Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Chilean Navy, and his Argentine colleague, Carlos Marrón, signed a memorandum of understanding for the joint construction of warships in Chilean shipyards, known as the Proyecto Fragata Binacional Operation.

2.4 Other bilateral military cooperation relations

Argentine and Uruguayan Armed Forces have traditionally kept solid institutional links. The Argentine and Uruguayan Air Force have signed agreements and carried out cooperative exchanges for years. The following should be noted: the Convention for Professional and Technological Complementation, the personnel exchange of the II and III Air Brigade of Argentine and Uruguayan Air Forces, cadet level exchanges of officers, pilots and maintenance personnel and joint exercises in arms systems. Also, since 1992, Argentine Air Force instructors have trained personnel from the Uruguayan Air Force and carried out personnel exchanges to train crews for the IA-58 Pucara airplane, used by both forces.

The Argentine and Uruguayan Navy have periodically carried out naval operations and annual Chiefs of Staff exchanges since 1970. Argentina received Uruguayan officers every year for regular courses at the Naval War School. Even though cooperative relations between both armies were traditionally fluent in exchanges, this became more intense after the participation of Uruguay in the joint combined exercises carried out by Argentina and Brazil since 1996.

The Argentine Army also carried out exchange programs with Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador and Venezuela. The Instruction and Training flights for Superior and Subordinate Personnel included the participation of Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil and Chile and the ATLASUR Operation included the participation of Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina and South Africa. These are a few examples of exchange programs. It is important to highlight that most of these ties are permanent.

Argentina has carried out periodic bilateral security consultations with the United States and Canada since 1993 and 1994. The I Round of Bilateral Consultations on Non-proliferation, Regional and Global Security took place in 1993 with the United States. The II Round was carried out the following year. Working groups were formed on specific issues and have continued their work, to date. Every two years the Chiefs of State of the Argentine and United States Navies have carried out strategic dialogue meetings. Surface Navy, Navy Aviation and Marine Infantry Committee Meetings have been carried out annually. Joint exercises have become somewhat customary, such as the FLEETEX exercise with the United States Navy, the IMARAUSMC training exercise in riparian conditions and the GRINGO-GAUCHO air-naval exercise during the transit of a United States aircraft carrier. There have been diverse officer and non-commissioned officer exchanges. Skill courses have predominated in the Air Force, such as those at the Air War College and at the Air Command. An annual Bilateral Working Group was organized with Canada with the participation of Defense and Foreign Relations Ministries and Armed Forces representatives. Argentina and Canada have carried out many joint exercises linked to peacekeeping operations.

2.5 The South Atlantic as a peace and security zone

After the reestablishment of relations between Argentina and the United Kingdom in February 1990, both States aimed to increase mutual confidence and diminish the possibilities of accidents or security misperceptions. The absence of a solution to the dispute between both countries has not hindered the initiation of a constructive dialogue concerning the development of confidence-building measures in the South Atlantic. The Argentine-British Working Group on South Atlantic Issues developed reapproachment tasks between Argentina and the United Kingdom.

This process was initiated in New York in August 1989 and led both parties to agree to future negotiations in Madrid. In October of that same year, negotiations continued at the first meeting of the bilateral Argentine Working Group. A "sovereignty umbrella" formula was established over the Malvinas/Falklands Islands, the Georgia and South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime spaces. This allowed the issue to remain unresolved until both parties considered its inclusion appropriate.

As a consequence of the issues discussed in a second bilateral meeting carried out in Madrid, both governments agreed to sign a Joint Statement in February 1990. With this Declaration, they made the results of the approximation process public and set the foundations for bilateral cooperation. After this meeting, the protection zone of 200 nautical miles established by the United Kingdom around the Islands became inoperative. Diplomatic relations between both States were reestablished and the first measures were taken to create confidence and avoid military incidents. Both governments decided to execute a transitory system of reciprocal Information and Consultation in the zone in dispute. This consisted of:

- A transitory system of reciprocal Information and Consultation.
- A system of direct communication.
- A series of behavior rules for each of the navy and air forces' units that operate near the area in dispute.
- The agreement of a series of common procedures in case of emergency.
- The establishment of an information and cooperation exchange system for maritime and air navigation security and control in the area.

The system's purpose was to reduce the possibility of incidents and limit the consequences of those incidents through the increase of mutual knowledge of military activities in the South Atlantic. Argentina and the United Kingdom set guidelines for reciprocal information on military movements. The presence of an observer ship during the other party's exercises was considered. Both countries committed to informing the other, with at least 48 hours of notice, of the intention, identification, course and purpose of ships or air crafts that were planning to come nearer than 50 nautical miles or 70 miles by air.

Observer ships and consultations through the direct communication system served as verification that these measures were respected. Also, both parties were allowed to visit the other's military bases and naval units. In the Joint Statement of September 1991, and according to the progress in mutual confidence matters, both countries agreed on additional measures that implied a new transitory system of reciprocal information and consultation. From that point on, a minimum of 48 hours was established to notify course, identification and purpose of all naval combat units planning operations nearer than 15 nautical miles from the coast. The verification was to be carried out by the Direct Consultation system.

Also, the Terminal Control Zone was created for the Monte Agradable Airport (Malvinas/Falklands) as part of an operational agreement between the Comodoro Rivadavia Area Control Center and the Monte Agradable Airport Air Transit Service Unit. The system's purpose was to make control easier and provide air transit services for operations carried out to and from the airport. In June 1993, the transitory reciprocal information and consultation system was once again modified. The new mechanism consisted of a direct communication system between military authorities, allowing the direct coordination of technical measures considered necessary. Furthermore, the prohibition zone for obligatory information about maneuvers was reduced to 55 nautical miles.

During the eighth reunion of the Argentine-British Work Group, both parties focused on the accomplishments of the system so far. Looking ahead, they proposed the reduction of the prohibition zone to 50 nautical miles. In the military field, the Argentine-British Military Contact Rounds, carried out since 1990, have sought to exchange experiences regarding the organization and operation of Defense Systems, participation in the United Nations Peace Keeping Forces and the exploration of possibilities to increase exchanges of both countries' military institutions.

2.6 Mercosur as a peace and security zone

The XIV Common Market Council Meeting took place in July 1998. During this summit in Ushuaia, Mercosur and associated countries' presidents signed the Political Declaration of Mercosur, Bolivia and Chile as a peace zone¹⁸. With this declaration, the regional community agreed to fortify consultation and cooperation mechanisms in security and defense issues and to promote their progressive articulation. They also strove to advance cooperation in confidence-building measures and to promote their implementation¹⁹.

The declaration explicitly enlisted itself in the hemispheric security process by mentioning the 1991 Santiago Compromise as an antecedent and the Santiago and San Salvador (1995 and 1998) Declarations on Confidence and Security Building Measures as immediate precedents. The Declaration also expressed

support and reaffirmed the adherence of member countries to the Tlatelolco Treaty on Nuclear Weapons Proscription in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as the Mendoza Compromise on the Complete Proscription of Chemical and Biological Weapons of 1991.

The Political Declaration of Mercosur, Bolivia and Chile as a Peace Area proclaimed this wide sub region free of antipersonnel land mines and expressed the desire of the Member States to extend that area to include the entire Western Hemisphere. All countries involved expressed their commitment to extend and systemize the information provided to the UN Register of Conventional Arms and to establish consistent guidelines for military expenses to increase transparency and build confidence. They also asserted their support of the Hemispheric Security Commission' work. They sent the Declaration to both the UN's General Secretary and the OAS, requesting the Declaration's circulation as an official document of both organizations.

3. Towards the re-founding of hemispheric security

In the last ten years, the American States have moved—however sinuously—towards the construction of a Security Community of Democratic States. The notion of security that developed in the region is one based on confidence building and, particularly, the collective support to democratic stability and consolidation. This notion of security has tended to predominate among the more advanced economies and political systems, and has gradually become a major cleavage in the disperse set of values of the American States. In face of authoritarian regressions in the Andean Countries and Paraguay, the emphasis on the latter reflect the security priorities of a region which has suffered more from authoritarian assaults and human right violations than from wars among rival states.

Further, the meaning of democratic consolidation in the region is diverse. In some cases, democratic consolidation means the absence of threats to the continuity of democracy as a regime for appointing political authorities. This includes a minimum of institutional independence of Congress and the Judiciary, as well as a minimum of state of law. The Andean countries and Paraguay do not thoroughly match today even this minimalist standard of democratic consolidation.

Other countries, such as Brazil, Chile and Uruguay do offer those guaranties. The armed forces do **not** constitute a threat to democratic stability. However, the theory and practice of military institutions is far away from meeting the standards of a fully established system of representative institutions. In these cases, democratic consolidation means moving toward the thorough subordination of the armed forces to constitutional authority, the absence of pressures conditioning that authority, and the full political capacity of the latter to make and implement defense and military policy.

Out of the post-authoritarian democracies, Argentina is the most significant case in this regard. However, even in this case democratic consolidation is not fully established. The institutionalization of civilian authority still lacks the administrative and professional capacities for effective civilian control. The armed forces respond to civilian authority but the latter does not have the channels—nor the political will to create them—in order to exert an effective and substantive role in defense and military policy making and implementation. However, in the long run, democratic stability *cum* civilian control seems to be the predominant tendency in the major Latin American countries, namely, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Chile.

The emphasis on civil-military relations does not mean to ignore other (more important) dimensions of democratic consolidation: the quality of institutions, the Congress and the Judiciary in particular. The emphasis on civil-military relations, however, responds to the relevance of the latter to new approaches to security viable. Democratic stability *cum* civilian control is a major precondition for the credibility and effectiveness of confidence building measures and cooperative security approaches. Contrariwise, the higher the level of military autonomy the more effective the armed forces' capacity to question and resist confidence building and cooperative security. Thus the limitations in practice of the agreements and declarations at the diplomatic level described in this paper and the significance of democracy as the cornerstone of the new security consensus of the American States.

Further, from the perspective of those countries with a significant commitment to global security, it is clear that old fashioned, quasi-democratic civil-military constitute a severe restriction to national and regional contributions to that field. During the 1990s, Argentina and Canada have made significant efforts—with some, albeit limited, success—to persuade other members of the incipient security community to engage in a more active commitment to global security.

On the other hand, autonomous military establishments have been effective at resisting the update of defense policies accordingly with the changes in the international system and the standards and values of a democratic society. To some extent, they have succeed in supporting the continuity of defense policies which suffer of transparency, emerge from a process far from being responsive to the peoples' will and promote old fashion hypotheses of conflict with neighbor countries. They have also forwarded unconvincing North-South conflict scenarios, and questioned, on the same grounds, the convenience for the national interest of global security engagements—which are told to be either a way of weakening the national defense capacities or serving the interests of North American stronghold of world politics.

Although these resistances and the continuity of military autonomy do not necessarily signify a threat for other countries, they do constitute an obstacle to any initiative of regional coordination of political and military efforts to meet the regional challenges and objectives in terms of democratic stability, human rights guarantees, regional contributions to global security and collective actions against narcotraffic and organized crime. They have also delayed the transformation of the OAS into an effective forum for the coordination of security efforts and capabilities, beyond the initial achievements in the realm of confidence building, and cooperative security.

In synthesis, the American States combine new and old elements of the security environment. In spite of obstacles, delays and even some reversals in democratic consolidation, the American States face an unprecedented opportunity to re-establish hemisphere security and develop the grounds for the building of a security community.

In order to re-establish the Inter-American Security System the key lays in the strategic assessment that the community of Latin American countries, plus Canada makes of their regional relation with the United States. In the last ten years, the United States has shown a clear willingness not to impose its standards or views in security matters in the region.

On the other hand, they have focused on the control and the fighting of narco cartels and organized crime, and its policies and approaches are far from successful in the field and not very positive in the building of regional consensus.

As a result, the American States suffer the lack of a relevant consensus on which are the security challenges and objectives at the regional level and thus the capacity to come up with a convincing security proposal which may increase the—or, better, originate a—commitment of the United States with the Hemisphere in the security field. Given the relative economic significance of the region *vis à vis* Europe, Japan, China and the South East Asian countries, and the relative strategic significance of the region *vis à vis* the former plus Australia, New Zealand and the oil-supplier countries, the only possible “glue” for the American States lays in the political realm, particularly in the security field. If the key to an increased commitment of the United States with the region depends on political factors, there is no stronger political symbol than a security commitment.

The task is not at all simple, given the heterogeneity of views in Latin America with regard to global security, the USA, state sovereignty, and related issues, together with the asymmetries in the consolidation (or even survival) of democracy in the region.

However, all American States would benefit from making progress to a common view with regard to the basic questions that constitute the new security agenda of the region. In particular, the question regarding the new terms and objectives of the Hemispheric Security System and, more specifically, **which is the meaning of Hemispheric Security when there are no extra-regional threats, and intra-regional interstate conflicts have been reduced to a minimum.**

Beyond the abovementioned differences in views, interests and approaches among the American States, Latin American countries cannot continue to ignore the fact that narco cartels and organized crime, together with guerrilla warfare and terrorism, constitute the most significant threat to national and regional security, and should be placed at the highest priority level on the security agenda of Inter-American Relations.

As it happens in other regions, progress in cooperative security has taken place together with the rise and spread of new kinds of threats to national security and, particularly to the security of individuals and the values and institutions, which underlie social cohesion. As the studies promoted by the United Nations in the mid nineteen nineties have specified, the emerging security threats do not aim at the State as much as societies, the individual, national identities, democratic values, public institutions, national economies, their financial institutions and international norms and codes of conduct²⁰.

If the American States make a reasonable assessment of the actual likelihood of traditional threats to national security in our region and, also, of the window of opportunity that has opened with the progress toward the building of a security community made in the last ten years, the agenda of Inter-American Relations in this field is rather obvious. It includes, in a predominant place, the update of the Hemispheric Security

System, the revision of the Inter-American Board, and the strengthening of civilian control and the empowerment of civilian authority.

On the other hand, and this is even more difficult, the American States must face the challenge of consensus building with regard to fighting organized crime and preventing terrorism. If the region may have a future, Latin American countries are to build a minimum consensus on what to propose to, and what to expect from the United States in regard to new threats. Otherwise, the American States' initial progress towards the building of a security community, which showed some endurance by the mid 1990s, will gradually languish, the United States will continue to act in solitude—thus ineffectively—and the intertwining of poverty, weak institutions, and narco cartels + organized crime actions and increasing presence in all dimensions of politics, economics and society will continue to grow and to change the profile of our countries, our politics and daily life, as it has been doing in the last decade.

Endnotes

1. See, for example, Stanley Hoffmann, "The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism", **Foreign Policy** (Spring 1995): 159-177; Joseph Nye, "Peering into the Future", **Foreign Affairs** 73:4 (July/August 1994); and Edward Luttwak, "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare", **Foreign Affairs** 74:3 (May/June 1995): 109-122.
2. Michael Clarke, in "The Shape of Wars to Come", **Foreign Service**, Spring 1996; and Gareth Evans, in "Cooperative Security and Intrastate Conflict", **Foreign Policy** 96 (Fall 1994): 3-20 describe these emerging tendencies.
3. Lawrence Freedman, "International Security: Changing Targets", **Foreign Policy** (Spring 1998): 48-65; Eric de la Maisonneuve, **Incitation a la Réflexion Stratégique** (Paris: Ed. Economica, 1998); Joseph Nye, Jr. "Redefining the National Interest", **Foreign Affairs** 78:4 (Jul/Aug 1999); and Keith Krause, and Michael C. Williams, "From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security Studies", en Keith Krause, and Michael C. Williams (Eds.), **Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases** (Minnesota: UCL Press, 1997) have made an important contribution to this renewed vision of strategic thinking.
4. See, for example, William Perry, John Steinbruner y Ashton Carter, **A New Concept of Cooperative Security** (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1992); Janne E. Nolan (Ed.), **Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century** (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994); and Gareth Evans, **Cooperating for peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990's and Beyond** (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1993). These works have made a major contribution to disseminating the concept and the policy approach of cooperative security. In addition, a significant number of authors have contributed to grasping the major tendencies toward the building of security communities -the latter being a process which transcends cooperative security. See, among others, the compilations by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett **Security Communities** (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998); David A. Lake, and Patrick M. Morgan, **Regional Security: Building Security in a New World** (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); y Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell, **Regionalism in World Politics** (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1995) and, particularley, the analyses by Barry Buzan, "Security, the State, the 'New World Order' and Beyond", en Ronnie Lipschutz (Ed.) **On Security** (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) and Andrew Hurrell, "An Emerging Community in South America?" in the op. cit. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett **Security Communities**.
5. For a comparative assessment of global tendencies in this regard, see the compilation by Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorensen, **Whose World Order?: Uneven Globalization and the end of the Cold War** (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995).
6. In **Grasping the Democratic Peace** (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996) Bruce Russett (Ed.) provides important insights as well as analytical and methodological tools for this analysis. In "Democratization and the Danger of War" **International Security** 20:1 (Summer 1995): 5-38 Jack Snyder and Edward Mansfield argue that, in the context of transition to democracy, States may turn more aggressive and prone to conflict and war. Nevertheless, the authors underscore the distinctive character of the Latin American experience of the eighties and early nineties (with the obvious exception of Peru-Ecuador). See also Mónica Hirst, **Security Policies, Democratization and Regional Integration in the Southern Cone**, FLACSO Working Documents, Buenos Aires, August 1995.
7. By security process, I understand a series of interactions between States -through political, military and non-governmental institutions- that tend to modify perceptions, focal points and institutional practices in security matters. The security process, emphasizes in a increasing manner, the importance of preventive focal points and promotes cooperation relations amongs States. This includes, joint decisions at the highest political level. With time, the security process shapes an intermediate situation between the classic relation of a balance of power and desired situation of cooperative security.
8. See Hugo L. Carnelutti, **Seguridad Interamericana. ¿Un Subsistema del Sistema Interamericano?** (Buenos Aires: Centro de Estudios para la Nueva Mayoría, 1992).
9. Resolution 1080 and the Santiago Commitment have become alternative expressions that refer to the decision made by the American States.
10. There is a great deal of literature on the security experience in Europe. See, among others, Emanuel Adler, "Seed of peaceful change: The OSCE's security community-building model", in E. Adler (Ed.), **Security Communities** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Marie-France Desjardins, "Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures", **Adelphi Paper 307**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996; Zdzislaw Lachowski, "The Vienna -confidence and security-building measures", in **Conventional arms control in Europe**, pp. 618-631; Dieter Lutz, "Foundation of the European Security Structure. Role of the OSCE", **Review of International Affairs** LVIII (15th January 1997): 11-23; Heinz Vetschera, "The Role of the CSCE in European Conflict Prevention", presented at the Conference The Art of Conflict Prevention: Theory and Practice, Helsinki, June 2nd, 1992; y Andrés Fontana, **Seguridad Cooperativa: Tendencias Globales y Oportunidades para el Continente Americano**, Documento de Trabajo ISEN Nro. 16, Buenos Aires: Instituto del Servicio Exterior de la Nación, 1996.
- 11 See Andrew Hurrell, "An Emerging Community in South America?", *op. cit.*
12. See the section on the December 9th, 1995, Santiago Declaration on Trust and Security Building Measures below.
13. The document is also known as the "Williamsburg Declaration", which is inaccurate since it is not a document approved by the meeting's participants. Nevertheless, its is important to emphasize that the United States' government's proposal and the vision of hemispheric security in the document are explicitly based on **Resolution 1080** and reflect, in general terms, the consensus on security matters that the American States built during the first half of the decade.
14. The particular section of this paper offers detailed information of this subject.
15. Resolutions AG/Res. 1409 (XXVI-0/96) and AR/RES. 1494 (XXVII-0/97).
16. The agreement has been in force since March 1994.
17. In 1998, during the nuclear tests in India and Pakistan, member countries of G-7 invited Argentina and Brazil to report on their experience in non-proliferation matters and the cooperative mechanism designed at the beginning of the decade.
18. Mercosur/CMC/Acta N° 1/98 XIV Reunión del Consejo del Mercado Común.
19. Declaración Política del Mercosur, Bolivia y Chile como Zona de Paz y Seguridad (Ushuaia, julio de 1998).
20. Cfr. **Informe de la Conferencia Ministerial Mundial sobre la Delincuencia Transnacional Organizada**, celebrada en Nápoles (Italia), noviembre 21-23 1994, según resolución 48/103 de la Asamblea General del 20 de diciembre de 1993; el **Documento de Base: Problemas y peligros que plantea la delincuencia transnacional organizada en las distintas regiones del mundo**, preparado para la mencionada Conferencia; y la resolución aprobada por la Asamblea General "Medidas para eliminar el terrorismo internacional" (preparada sobre la base del Informe de la Sexta Comisión (A.49/743) febrero 17,1995.

